A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in Constitutional Context by Lawson, Gary
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
2008 
A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in Constitutional 
Context 
Gary Lawson 
Boston Univeristy School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in Constitutional Context, 83 Notre Dame 
Law Review 469 (2008). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/1045 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship 
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at 
Boston University School of Law. For more information, 
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu. 
ARTICLES
A TRUISM WITH ATTITUDE:




I. THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT .......... 473
A. What a Difference(?) a Day Makes ....................... 473
B. The Original Meaning of the Bill of Rights ............... 475
C. The Sweep of the Sweeping Clause ....................... 480
D. The Rewards of Redundancy ............................ 485
E. The "Proper" Understanding of the Tenth Amendment ..... 491
II. THE TENTH AMENDMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT .... 495
A. Commandeering ....................................... 496
B. Spending Conditions ................................... 498
C. Regulation of State Affairs .............................. 501
CONCLUSION .................................................... 504
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Amendment is caught in a crossfire hurricane. From
one direction, it is dismissed as "but a truism"' with no significant con-
stitutional function. From another direction, its unassuming lan-
guage- "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
© 2008 Gary Lawson. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I am grateful to Steven G.
Calabresi, Patricia B.G. Lawson, and Guy Seidman for helping to generate some of
the ideas that led to this Article, to the participants at a workshop at Boston University
School of Law for comments, and to the Abraham and Lillian Benton Fund for
support.
1 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
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Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people" 2-has inspired Byzantine doc-
trines concerning such matters as federal commandeering of state
institutions,3 conditions on federal spending programs implemented
by states,4 and federal regulation of state governmental institutions. 5
The Tenth Amendment thus appears to be either the constitutional
equivalent of a skin tag or a tumorous font of emanations and penum-
bras that would make even William 0. Douglas wince.
As a matter of original meaning, both characterizations of the
Tenth Amendment are actually correct. The Tenth Amendment is
indeed "but a truism" that does not change the legal landscape. No
federal law that was constitutional on December 14, 1791, suddenly
became unconstitutional the next day when the Tenth Amendment
was ratified. On the other hand, almost all of the federal laws that
have been invalidated or seriously questioned in the name of the
Tenth Amendment over the past two centuries really were at least
arguably unconstitutional. The Tenth Amendment is a truism with
attitude.
The key to understanding the Tenth Amendment is found in the
company that it keeps. The Tenth Amendment was part of a package
of twelve amendments submitted by the First Congress to the states for
ratification, the last ten of which were ratified in 1791.6 Contrary to
the thrust of much of modern constitutional doctrine, the Bill of
Rights as a whole is largely "but a truism" that did not significantly
change the legal landscape upon ratification any more than did the
Tenth Amendment. Outside of federal territories and the District of
2 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
3 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-75 (1992).
4 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987); Guillen v. Pierce
County, 31 P.3d 628, 731-34 (Wash. 2001), rev'd in part, 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
5 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530 (1985);
Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841-42 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469
U.S. at 531.
6 Two of the proposed amendments-the original First and Second Amend-
ments-failed to secure the necessary three-fourths majority of the states for ratifica-
tion. For the story of the two failed amendments, see AKI-IL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 8-19 (1998). Two centuries later, one of the original failed amendments
finally secured the necessary ratification votes and now stands as the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXVII ("No law, varying the compensation for
the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of
Representatives shall have intervened.").
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Columbia, 7 most laws that violate Bill of Rights provisions such as the
First Amendment were unconstitutional even before ratification of the Bill of
Rights because they exceed the enumerated powers of Congress. The
primary function of the Bill of Rights, including the Tenth Amend-
ment, as originally understood8 is to emphasize, clarify, and amplify
restrictions on federal power contained in the Constitution of 1787.
That does not make the various Bill of Rights provisions unimportant.
But it does suggest that the meaning of the Bill of Rights, including
the Tenth Amendment, is to be found primarily in the text, structure,
and history of the Constitution of 1787 rather than in the specific
wording of the amendments. It also suggests that there is no sharp
interpretative break between the Tenth Amendment and the rest of
the Bill of Rights. The Tenth Amendment must draw upon back-
ground norms contained in the original Constitution in order to have
content, but the same is true of its nine siblings.
The Tenth Amendment needs a healthy dose of equal protection:
it needs to be read and understood as the full constitutional
equivalent of the nine simultaneously ratified amendments that
accompanied it. Accordingly, Part I of this Article defines the consti-
tutional role of the Bill of Rights as an integrated whole. Central to
that role, and ultimately central to the meaning of the Tenth Amend-
ment, is the provision at the end of Article I, Section 8 that empowers
Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof."9 This "sweeping clause, as it
has been affectedly called" 10 is one of the Constitution's most impor-
tant guardians of limited government. The Bill of Rights was effec-
tively redundant primarily because federal laws abridging the rights
and freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights are not in fact "neces-
7 For the role of the Bill of Rights in federal territories, see infra notes 90-92
and accompanying text.
8 This Article seeks to identify original constitutional meaning, not to describe
actual constitutional practices that have evolved over the past two centuries, to predict
future case outcomes, or to prescribe rules of decision for modem actors. It is thus a
species of what Cynthia Farina once termed "legal archaeology." See Gary Lawson,
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1231, 1232 n.8 (1994).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
10 THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 203 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Although the label "the Sweeping Clause" was used by the Antifederalists as a
pejorative, the term was adopted by the Constitution's defenders and was the stan-
dard label for the Clause throughout the founding era. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B.
Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping
Clause, 443 DuKE L.J. 267, 270 (1993).
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sary and proper for carrying into Execution" federal powers. The Bill
of Rights, including the Tenth Amendment, in large measure simply
reformulates the restrictions on federal power built into the Sweeping
Clause. Laws therefore violate the Tenth Amendment when they
interfere with the federalist structure of government in such a manner
and to such an extent that they are not "necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution" national power.'1 Because the meaning of
the Tenth Amendment is parasitic on the meaning of the Sweeping
Clause, the Tenth Amendment is indeed "but a truism." The same
can generally be said, however, for the rest of the Bill of Rights. Mod-
ern law and scholarship sometimes try to distinguish the first eight (or
perhaps nine) amendments from the Tenth Amendment on the
ground that the former "prohibit[] the enactment of a category of
laws that would otherwise be authorized" while the latter "impose [s]
no restriction on the exercise of delegated powers." 12 This is true to a
limited extent, but when taken too far it fundamentally misunder-
stands the original meaning of the first nine amendments, which prin-
cipally restate rather than create limitations on federal power in the
same fashion as does the Tenth Amendment. Thus, to call the Tenth
Amendment "but a truism" is not to brand it an outlier or to consign
it to constitutional irrelevance-unless one is prepared to make the
same characterization of the nine amendments that precede it.
11 Technically, the "necessary and proper" requirement applies only to laws
enacted by Congress under the Sweeping Clause, not to actions taken by the Presi-
dent or the federal courts pursuant to their own constitutionally enumerated powers.
But the executive and judicial powers are both internally constrained by considera-
tions very similar to those contained in the Sweeping Clause by virtue of the "princi-
ple of reasonableness" that accompanied eighteenth-century delegations of
governmental power. For a detailed discussion of the principle of reasonableness and
its relationship to the "necessary and proper" requirement in the Sweeping Clause,
see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 1,
48-54. This is significant because every Bill of Rights provision except the First
Amendment by its terms potentially applies to executive and judicial action. See id. at
18 n.55. Although this Article focuses on how Bill of Rights provisions largely repli-
cate principles in the Sweeping Clause, for the same reasons they also largely replicate
principles in the Article II and Article III Vesting Clauses. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1,
cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1. As for congressional exercises of power that do not involve the
Sweeping Clause: outside of federal territories, it is close to a null set. See infra note
92.
12 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 941 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 858 (1976) (Brennan,J., dissenting)
(noting that while the commerce power may not infringe First Amendment liberties,
there is no restraint on such power based on state sovereignty), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 661 (5th ed. 2006).
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It is sensible to employ emphasizing, clarifying, and amplifying
provisions when emphasis, clarification, and amplification are
needed. But there is a danger that constitutional provisions correctly
invoked for emphasis or clarity may take on a life of their own and
extend beyond their proper scope. To determine whether this threat
has been realized with respect to the Tenth Amendment, Part II of
this Article briefly applies the original meaning of the Tenth Amend-
ment (and the constitutional principles which it reflects) to the most
important doctrinal areas in which the Amendment has been invoked.
As it happens, the original principles of limited federal power and
state sovereignty that are constitutionally expressed in the Tenth
Amendment generate something reasonably close to the doctrines
that have evolved in the Amendment's name. To be sure, those doc-
trines could legitimately have evolved entirely without reference to
the Tenth Amendment, but by the same token a good portion of, for
example, First Amendment doctrine could legitimately have evolved
entirely without reference to the First Amendment.' 3 Once the Tenth
Amendment is understood to carry other provisions of the Bill of
Rights in its interpretative wake-and vice versa-it becomes much
easier to appreciate its appropriate constitutional role as a restraint on
the extent to which federal activity unduly constrains the prerogatives
of the states or the people.
I. THE BILL OF RiGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
A. What a Difference(?) a Day Makes
On December 14, 1791, the Constitution consisted solely of the
original, unamended text. Suppose that on that date, Congress
enacted a hypothetical statute that required the states either to adopt
a legislative plan to dispose of horse dung found on road construction
sites or to have their roadwork agencies take title to the dung and
assume any tort liability that results from it. Assume that the same bill
also provided federal money for state road construction on the condi-
tion that the states receiving federal funds limit marriages to unions of
one man and one woman and set minimum wage and maximum hour
rules for all state employees. One day later, on December 15, 1791,
the Tenth Amendment was ratified.
Under modern doctrine, at least three facets of this hypothetical
federal statute would face serious constitutional problems once the
13 To the extent that some portion of First Amendment doctrine (or any other
doctrine) could not legitimately have evolved in that fashion, it is, by virtue of that
fact, inconsistent with the Constitution's original meaning.
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Tenth Amendment was up and running on December 15, 1791.14
The requirement that states either pass certain laws or take title to
refuse would implicate the modern Court's "anticommandeering"
principle, which holds that Congress may not "commandeer[] the leg-
islative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact
and enforce a federal regulatory program," 15 nor may Congress offer
states "a 'choice' of either accepting ownership of waste or regulating
according to the instructions of Congress,"1 6 nor may Congress com-
pel states, through their executive actors, to administer federal pro-
grams. 17 The nongermane definition-of-marriage condition on the
receipt of road funds would face invalidation under the Supreme
Court's "conditional spending" doctrine because, according to the
Court, "conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are
unrelated 'to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs."' 18 And while the minimum wage/maximum hour regula-
tion in the hypothetical statute of 1791 would survive scrutiny under
the law as it stands in mid-2008, 19 a one-vote swing on the Supreme
Court that returns doctrine to its 1976-1984 status would invalidate
that provision as well, at least with respect to state employees whose
activity implicates "traditional aspects of state sovereignty. ' 20 If one
transplants modern doctrine back to the eighteenth century, the
Tenth Amendment would appear to be primed to do some serious
work in this case.
But what did the legal world look like on December 14, 1791,
before the Tenth Amendment took effect? Was the hypothetical fed-
eral statute constitutional on its date of enactment when there was no
Tenth Amendment but unconstitutional upon ratification of the
Tenth Amendment? If the Tenth Amendment is "but a truism," the
constitutional result would have to be the same on December 14,
1791, and December 15, 1791: either the statute was unconstitutional
both upon and after enactment, or it was constitutional upon enact-
14 In addition to the problems noted in the text, there would be a serious ques-
tion as to whether Congress had the constitutional authority to appropriate money for
state road construction in the first instance, but that is a topic for another time.
15 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
To be sure, Virginia Surface Mining did not itself establish my anticommandeering
principle, but its language foreshadowed subsequent holdings.
16 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992).
17 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933 (majority opinion).
18 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (quoting Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
19 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556-57 (1985).
20 Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849 (1976), overruled by Garcia,
469 U.S. at 531.
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ment, stayed constitutional after ratification of the Tenth Amend-
ment, and the modern doctrine saying otherwise simply
misunderstands the "truism" that is the Tenth Amendment. In other
words, if some part of this law is invalid under the Tenth Amendment,
is it because of something that happened on December 15, 1791,
when the Tenth Amendment was ratified or because of something
that happened on June 21, 1788, when the Constitution itself was
ratified?
B. The Original Meaning of the Bill of Rights
Before definitively deciding how to handle the foregoing hypo-
thetical statute, let us first take a lengthy but necessary detour through
another example involving other portions of the Bill of Rights. Sup-
pose that on December 14, 1791, Congress passed a statute forbidding
the publication of any pamphlets that were deemed by a government
censorship board to be unduly critical of Congress. In order to
enforce the statute and effectively ferret out offending material,
courts were authorized to issue to Treasury Department agents gen-
eral warrants to seize and search shipments of goods without particu-
larized cause or identification. Finally, the statute specified that
charges brought under the statute, including charges implicating the
death penalty, shall be by information rather than indictment, and
trials of offenses under the statute shall be by judges without juries.
On December 15, 1791, this statute would be flagrantly unconsti-
tutional on at least four separate grounds (criminal procedure mavens
could surely find more). First, it would violate the First Amendment's
command that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press." 2 1 Second, it would violate the Fourth
Amendment's rule that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
22
Third, the provision bypassing grand jury indictment would contra-
vene the Fifth Amendment's command that "[nIo person shall be
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a GrandJury."23 And fourth, the provi-
sion for mandatory bench trials would contradict the Sixth Amend-
ment's injunction that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
21 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22 Id. amend. IV.
23 Id. amend. V.
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the crime shall have been committed."2 4 The Bill of Rights would lay
waste to this statute.
But is the statute unconstitutional only because of the Bill of
Rights? Was the statute constitutional on December 14, 1791, before
the Bill of Rights ever existed? The Federalist supporters of the Con-
stitution in the late eighteenth century uniformly would have said
"no" to both questions.
Consider the provision restricting the publication of antigovern-
ment pamphlets. During the ratification debates, when opponents of
the Constitution raised the specter of precisely such laws-and the
absence of a Bill of Rights to prevent them-as a reason to vote down
the proposed Constitution, the Federalists countered that any such
laws would be unconstitutional even without a Bill of Rights or a First
Amendment because of the fundamental principle of enumerated
federal powers. Unlike "normal" governments, which were presump-
tively omnipotent unless specifically limited by fundamental charters
or background norms, the new national government created by the
Constitution was a government of limited and enumerated powers.
25
It could only act pursuant to specific (which does not necessarily
mean express) constitutional authorization. And a parade of Federal-
ist heavyweights were quick to point out that the Federal Constitution
does not enumerate any power that would permit Congress to restrict
the liberties ultimately identified in the First Amendment. As Hugh
Williamson memorably put it in a ratification-era letter, "[E]xamine
the Plan [of the Constitution], and you will find that the Liberty of the
Press and the laws of Mahomet are equally affected by it."2 6 James
Wilson added during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention,
It is very true, sir, that this Constitution says nothing with regard to
that subject [of the press], nor was it necessary; because it will be
found that there is given to the general government no power what-
soever concerning it; and no law, in pursuance of the Constitution,
can possibly be enacted to destroy that liberty.
27
24 Id. amend. VI.
25 See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 789-90 (1995).
26 Hugh Williamson, Remarks on the New Plan of Government, ST. GAZETTE N.C.,
1788, reprinted in EssAYs ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 395, 398 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., Burt Franklin 1970) (1892).
27 2JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 449 (photo. reprint 1996) (Jonathan Elliot
ed., Phila., J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (state-
ment ofJames Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention on December 1, 1787).
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Similar statements during the ratification debates came from such
notables as Oliver Ellsworth, 28 James Iredell,2 9 Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney,311 Edmund Randolph,3 1 and Roger Sherman. 32 The same
response was made to claims by Antifederalists that freedom of relig-
ion, freedom from general warrants, and rights to jury trial were in
danger without a Bill of Rights to safeguard them. As Edmund Ran-
dolph put it, "No part of the Constitution, even if strictly construed,
will justify a conclusion that the general government can take away or
impair the freedom of religion" 33-and he was seconded (and more)
during the ratification debates by, inter alia, Iredell,3 4 Richard
Spaight,3 5 and Wilson.3 6 Randolph made the same point with respect
to general warrants:
28 See Oliver Ellsworth, Landholder VI, CONN. COURANT, Dec. 10, 1787, reprinted in
14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 398, 401
(John P. Kaminski & GaspareJ. Saladino eds., 1983) (" There is no declaration of any kind
to preserve the liberty of the press, &c. Nor is liberty of conscience, or of matrimony, or of
burial of the dead; it is enough that congress have no power to prohibit either.... .").
29 SeeJAMES IREDELL, OBSERVATIONS ON GEORGE MASON'S OBJECTIONS TO THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION, reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 333, 361 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., B. Franklin 1971) (1888) ("If the Congress
should exercise any other power over the press than [the copyright power] . . . they
will do it without any warrant from this constitution .... ").
30 See 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 315 (statement of Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney at the South Carolina ratifying convention on January 18, 1788) ("The gen-
eral government has no powers but what are expressly granted to it; it therefore has
no power to take away the liberty of the press.").
31 See 3 id. at 203 (statement of Edmund Randoph at the Virginia ratifying con-
vention) ("Go through these powers, examine every one, and tell me if the most
exalted genius can prove that the liberty of the press is in danger.").
32 See Roger Sherman, Observations on the New Federal Constitution, CONN. CoU-
RANT, Jan. 7, 1788, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 524, 525 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) ("The liberty of the press can
be in no danger, because that is not put under the direction of the new
government.").
33 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 469 (statement of Edmund Randolph at
the Virginia ratifying convention on June 15, 1788).
34 See 4 id. at 194 (statement of James Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying
convention on July 30, 1788) ("Is there any power given to Congress in matters of
religion? ... If any future Congress should pass an act concerning the religion of the
country, it would be an act which they are not authorized to pass, by the
Constitution .... ").
35 See id. at 208 (statement of Richard D. Spaight at the North Carolina ratifying
convention onJuly 30, 1788) ("As to the subject of religion .... [n]o power is given to
the general government to interfere with it at all. Any act of Congress on this subject
would be a usurpation.").
36 See 2 id. at 455 (statement of James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying con-
vention on December 4, 1787) ("[W]e are told that there is no security for the rights
2oo8]
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The honorable gentleman says there is no restraint on the power
of issuing general warrants. If I be tedious in asking where is that
power, you will ascribe it to him who has put me to the necessity of
asking. They have no such power given them: if they have, where is
it? 3 7
Hamilton extended the argument to jury trials,38 and "An Impartial
Citizen" denied that the Constitution gave Congress the enumerated
power to impose cruel and unusual punishments. 39 The Federalists'
consistent line was that the original, unamended Constitution, by vir-
tue of the structure of enumerated powers, already prohibited virtu-
ally any law that would run afoul of what ultimately became the Bill of
Rights.
The Constitution, of course, does not necessarily mean what the
Federalists said it meant. Original constitutional meaning does not lie
within the heads of specific, historically concrete individuals. The
meaning of a collectively produced document such as the Constitu-
tion lies, rather, in how a hypothetical reasonable observer would have
understood it at the time of its promulgation.40 The subjective beliefs
of individuals-even individuals as intimately involved in the drafting
and ratification process as the all-star roster of Federalists noted
above-are relevant to that inquiry but not decisive for it. The most
persuasive arguments for original constitutional meaning are textual,
intratextual, and structural arguments. Accordingly, one must ask
whether the Federalists were right about the effect of the pre-Bill of
Rights Constitution, and if so, what that tells us about the meaning of
the Tenth Amendment.
of conscience. I ask the honorable gentleman, what part of this system puts it in the
power of Congress to attack those rights?"). Additional sources for the same point,
during and after the ratification debates, can be found in Jim Allison & Susan Batte,
No Power to Congress over Religion: The "Elastic Clause" and the First Amendment,
http://candst.tripod.com/nopower.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2007).
37 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 600 (statement of Edmund Randolph at
the Virginia ratifying convention on June 24, 1788).
38 THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 183-84 ("It
would be ... absurd ... to believe that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for the
imposition of and collection of taxes, would involve that of ... abolishing the trial by
jury in cases relating to it.").
39 See An Impartial Citizen V, On the Federal Constitution, PETERSBURG VA. GAZETrE,
Feb. 28, 1788, reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 428, 431 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988).
40 For elaborations of this interpretative methodology from somewhat different
perspectives, see Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 551-59 (1994); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman,
Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 70-73 (2006).
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The Federalists clearly were right that the Constitution does not
contain any clauses expressly authorizing restrictions on the press or
religion, grants of general warrants, abolition of grand or petit juries,
and the like. The Constitution's grants of power to Congress include
a Bankruptcy Clause, 4' a Postal Roads Clause, 42 and even a Copyright
Clause 43 which specifically authorizes a very narrow and precise kind
of speech regulation, but there is no "Warrant Clause," "Bench Trial
Clause," or generalized "Speech or Religion Clause" among the con-
gressional grants of power. The existence of a power-granting provi-
sion targeted specifically at a certain kind of speech-and the clear
effect of the Copyright Clause is to permit Congress to punish speech
that violates a valid copyright law-strongly suggests that the Federal-
ists were right about the absence of a more general congressional
power to regulate speech. 44 By the same token, the specificity of the
enumerated grants of power in Article I, Section 8 also validates the
Federalists' broader claims about the lack of federal power to regulate
religion, issue general warrants, abolish jury trials, or violate other
background rights.
Although some Antifederalists challenged the very concept of
enumerated powers,45 a more common argument against ratification
of the Constitution located threats to liberty primarily in the Sweeping
Clause (as the founding generation called it) at the end of Article I,
Section 8, which grants Congress power "[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the forego-
ing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department of Officer
thereof. '46 Although there is no constitutional provision specifically
authorizing censorship of antigovernment pamphlets, couldn't a cor-
rupt Congress argue that such censorship laws were "necessary and
proper" for carrying into execution government policies that were
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress power to establish "uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States").
42 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (authorizing Congress "[t]o establish Post Offices and post
Roads").
43 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to secure "for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries").
44 Federalists such as Iredell and Williamson expressly pointed to the Copyright
Clause as evidence that Congress' power over speech was specific rather than general.
See IREDELL, supra note 29, at 361; Williamson, supra note 26, at 551.
45 Some Antifederalists doubted that limited government was even a conceptual
possibility. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 398 (statement of Thomas
Tredwell at the New York ratifying convention on July 1, 1788).
46 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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directly authorized by the Constitution? If, for example, Congress
had passed an unpopular tariff act pursuant to its undoubted power to
"lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,"47 couldn't it rea-
son that strong criticism of the law would reduce compliance, so that
stifling of criticism was "necessary and proper for carrying into Execu-
tion" this particular exercise of the taxing power? Similarly, couldn't
one regard general warrants and bench trials as "necessary and
proper" means for enforcing the law? Such fears about the possible
scope of the Sweeping Clause largely drove the push for a Bill of
Rights.
Corrupt Congresses not only could make such arguments but in
fact did make such arguments during the episodes surrounding the
Alien and Sedition Acts.48 But as James Madison was quick to point
out in his Report on the Virginia Resolutions, those arguments were con-
stitutionally wrong.49 The Sweeping Clause of Article I simply does
not authorize the kinds of liberty-infringing laws to which the Antifed-
eralists properly objected. A demonstration of this point risks taking
us far afield, but because the meaning of the Sweeping Clause effec-
tively determines the meaning of the Tenth Amendment, a brief sum-
mary of at least the argument's conclusions is necessary. 50
C. The Sweep of the Sweeping Clause
Four features of the Sweeping Clause significantly limit the power
that it grants to Congress. 5' First, the Sweeping Clause does not
authorize Congress to judge the extent of its own powers. The Sweep-
ing Clause only authorizes laws that "shall be" necessary and proper
for carrying into execution federal powers, not laws that "Congress
47 Id. art. I, § 8, ci. 1.
48 See David Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious Libel
into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 154, 178-83 (2001).
49 See JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS, reprinted in 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 546, 571-72.
50 For the lengthy arguments that generate these conclusions, see Randy E. Bar-
nett, The Original Meaning of the Necessmy and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183,
196-204 (2003); Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The "Proper" Understanding of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 247 (2005); Lawson & Granger,
supra note 10, at 326-34.
51 It is important to emphasize that the Sweeping Clause is not an affirmative
limitation on Congress in the fashion of the provisions in Article I, Section 9. Rather,
the Sweeping Clause is a grant of power to Congress. But as with any grant of power,
the scope of the grant is fixed by its terms. The Sweeping Clause is a limited rather
than unlimited grant of power. Whenever Congress must invoke the Sweeping Clause
as a constitutional authorization for its actions, it is only authorized to act in accor-
dance with the limitations built into the power grant.
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shall regard as" necessary and proper. There are indeed constitu-
tional provisions whose meanings quite explicitly depend on the sub-
jective beliefs of governmental actors, but the Sweeping Clause is not
one of them.52 In order to be constitutionally valid, a law enacted
pursuant to the Sweeping Clause must actually be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution federal power.
Second, laws enacted pursuant to the Sweeping Clause must be
"for carrying into Execution" some other enumerated federal power.
The Sweeping Clause can never be invoked as a freestanding power;
its use must always be tied to the implementation of some indepen-
dently granted federal power. The only questions are how closely the
use of the Sweeping Clause (the means) must be tied to the power
being implemented (the ends) and whether there are substantive con-
straints on the choice of means apart from the strength of the means-
ends causal connection.
That leads directly to the third and fourth limitations built into
the Sweeping Clause: any laws enacted by Congress to implement fed-
eral powers must be "necessary and proper" for that purpose. The
lengthy shadow of McCulloch v. Maryland5 3 often leads modern observ-
ers to give short shrift to the constitutional requirement that laws
enacted pursuant to the Sweeping Clause be "necessary and proper"
for effectuating federal powers, but that is a grave mistake both as a
matter of original meaning and as a matter of case analysis. Chief
Justice Marshall may or may not have been right in his ultimate con-
clusion that an incorporated national bank was "necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution" federal powers, 54 but he certainly did not
give the matter short shrift. 55 Nor could he reasonably have done so.
The words "necessary" and "proper" each have substantial and inde-
pendent 56 constitutional significance.
Alexander Hamilton insisted that a law was "necessary" under the
Sweeping Clause if it "'might be conceived to be conducive"' to
achieving legislative ends, 57 a position reflected in the preamble to
52 See Lawson & Granger, supra note 10, at 276-85.
53 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
54 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; see McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401-25.
55 For an informative and modestly revisionist account of McCulloch, see Stephen
Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REv. 795, 812-19 (1996).
56 For an extensive demonstration that the words "necessary" and "proper"
impose independent rather than redundant requirements in the Sweeping Clause,
see Lawson, supra note 50, at 249-55.
57 See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1848 (1791) (statement of James Madison quoting the
preamble to the bill for a Bank of the United States). Hamilton elsewhere said that
the word "necessary" means merely "that the interests of the government or person
require, or will be promoted by, the doing of this or that thing." Alexander Hamilton,
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the bill for the First Bank of the United States. Although this "rational
basis" understanding of constitutional necessity has effectively pre-
vailed as a matter of doctrine, 58 it flies in the face of overwhelming
textual and intratextual evidence to the contrary as a matter of origi-
nal meaning. Textually, the leading eighteenth-century dictionary
defined "necessary" as "1. Needful; indispensably requisite.... 2. Not
free; fatal; impelled by fate. 3. Conclusive; decisive by inevitable con-
sequence.'59 This is hardly consistent with Hamilton's interpreta-
tion.60 Intratextually, the Constitution uses the word "needful" when
it means a looser means-ends connection and "necessary" when it
means something stronger. 61 But neither can "necessary" mean the
strict standard of indispensability urged by ThomasJefferson in 179162
and the State of Maryland in 1819.63 While this position, unlike Ham-
ilton's, is at least linguistically plausible, it is intratextually unsustain-
able. As Chief Justice Marshall sagely observed, the Jeffersonian view
cannot account for the constitutional distinction between "necessary"
and "absolutely necessary" laws.64 It was left to James Madison to pro-
duce a "Madisonian compromise" between the extreme positions of
Hamilton and Jefferson. As Madison elegantly put it, constitutional
necessity entails "a definite connection between means and ends" that
links executory laws and executed power "by some obvious and pre-
cise affinity. '65 If there is a verbal formulation for the meaning of the
word "necessary" in the Sweeping Clause that better fits the available
linguistic and intratextual evidence, I have not seen it.
Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank
(Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 102 (Harold C. Syrett
ed., 1965).
58 See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (stating that executory laws
are constitutional when they achieve legitimate ends "by rational means").
59 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (photo. reprint
1979) (1755). The dictionary is not paginated.
60 Nor was eighteenth-century usage consistent with Hamilton's understanding.
See Lawson, supra note 50, at 245 n.56.
61 See id. at 245-46.
62 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing
a National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275, 278
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974) (asserting that laws are necessary only when they are
"means without which the grant of power would be nugatory").
63 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 367 (1819) (defining neces-
sary as "indispensably requisite").
64 See id. at 414-15.
65 Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON 447, 448 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908). For an account of the
debate between the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian understandings of "necessary," and
a defense of the "Madisonian compromise," see Lawson, supra note 50, at 242-48.
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For a law to be "proper" under the Sweeping Clause, it must
conform to the "proper" allocation of authority within the federal
government;.., be within the "proper" scope of the federal govern-
ment's limited jurisdiction with respect to the retained prerogatives
of the states; and . . .be within the "proper" scope of the federal
government's limited jurisdiction with respect to the people's
retained rights.
66
In other words, "proper" laws must respect background norms of sepa-
ration of powers, federalism, and individual rights. The argument for
this rather potent understanding of constitutional propriety is far too
intricate to summarize in this Article, 67 but in brief: the eighteenth-
century dictionary definition of "proper" was "1. Peculiar; not belong-
ing to more; not common .... 2. Noting an individual .... 3. One's
own . . . . 4. Natural; original.16 8 In the context of the Sweeping
Clause, this would most naturally mean that executory laws are
"proper" when they represent power that distinctly and peculiarly
belongs to the Congress of limited and enumerated powers estab-
lished by the Constitution.
Four structural considerations confirm this understanding. First,
the word "proper" adds to rather than replicates the limitations on
federal power imposed by the word "necessary." The Constitution is
freely redundant when it comes to provisions but not when it comes to
terms within provisions, where the familiar legal convention against
reading terms to be surplusage comes into play.69 Second, the quali-
fier "proper" does not appear in the clauses of the Constitution that
empower Congress to act as a general government with respect to the
District of Columbia and federal enclaves 70 and federal territory.71
This means that a "proper" law is one that is distinctively appropriate
to a limited rather than general government and therefore must be
consistent with the overall structure of limited government established
by the rest of the document. Third, the phrase "necessary and
proper" did not appear in any of the state constitutions that preceded
the Federal Constitution, further suggesting that the phrase is dis-
66 Lawson & Granger, supra note 10, at 297.
67 For an extended defense of this interpretation of the word "proper," see Law-
son, supra note 50, at 249-63; Lawson & Granger, supra note 10, at 289-326.
68 JOHNSON, supra note 59.
69 See Lawson, supra note 50, at 251-53.
70 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (empowering Congress "[t]o exercise exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever" over the nation's capital and federal enclaves).
71 Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (empowering Congress to make "all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States").
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tinctly associated with limited government and therefore must be con-
strued in light of the structure of a limited government. Fourth, and
perhaps most persuasively, an understanding of "necessary and
proper" in which necessity refers to causal relations and propriety
refers to substantive criteria such as proportionality and respect for
background norms brings the Sweeping Clause into perfect harmony
with the principle of reasonableness, which was one of the most funda-
mental eighteenth-century administrative law principles governing
delegated power.72 When fully fleshed out, these considerations are
sufficient to give the requirement of propriety in the Sweeping Clause
real substantive bite.
Given this understanding of Congress' power under the Sweep-
ing Clause, the Federalists were correct that Antifederalist concerns
about the meaning of the Constitution were overstated. 73 The kinds
of laws regulating speech or religion, authorizing general warrants, or
abolishing jury trials to which they (rightly) objected would likely fail
a Madisonian test of necessity and would unconditionally fail a test of
propriety. Madison made precisely this point when objecting to provi-
sions of the Alien and Sedition Acts,74 and he was right as a matter of
original constitutional meaning.
The consequence of this understanding of Article I, Section 8 is
that federal laws abridging the freedom of speech or religion, author-
izing general warrants, taking private property without just compensa-
tion, and violating rights to grand and petit juries were
unconstitutional from the moment that the Constitution was ratified. Many
of these laws were unnecessary, and all of them were improper. The
Bill of Rights emphasized and amplified their unconstitutionality but
did not create it.75 As far as these laws were concerned, December 15,
1791, was effectively a nonevent.
72 See Lawson, supra note 50, at 257-59. It would take a book to flesh out the
relationship between the principle of reasonableness and the Sweeping Clause-and
between the principle of reasonableness and other antecedents of the Constitution's
.necessary and proper" language such as the private law of agency. See Robert G.
Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 243, 284 (2004). If all goes well, such a book just might appear in the not-too-
distant future.
73 That emphatically does not mean that Antifederalist fears of oppression were
overstated, but merely that their concern that such oppression would be validated by
the Constitution was overstated. Constitutional meaning, after all, bears a decidedly
contingent relationship to constitutional action.
74 See 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 579 (James Madison's Report on the
Virginia Resolutions).
75 For a brief foreshadowing of this point, see Gary Lawson, The Bill of Rights as an
Exclamation Point, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 513 (1999).
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D. The Rewards of Redundancy
If the foregoing account of the Sweeping Clause is correct, then
what, from the standpoint of original meaning, is the purpose and
effect of the Bill of Rights? Why bother including a First Amendment
or a Fourth Amendment if they did not render unconstitutional some-
thing that would have been constitutional without them? A full
response to this question requires one final detour-this time into the
separation of powers-before we circle back to spell out the original
meaning of the Tenth Amendment.
Consider for a moment the purpose and effect of one of the
seemingly strangest clauses in the original Constitution: the Opinions
Clause, which states that the President "may require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments,
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.
' 76
The first sentence of Article II declares that "[t]he executive Power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. ' 77 This
Vesting Clause places all of the federal executive power in the person
of the President, which means that any subordinate official, including
"the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments," can only
exercise executive power under the control and supervision of the
President in whom that power ultimately resides. 78 Surely that super-
visory power includes the power to ask subordinates to draft memos
pertaining to their executive duties, so why would a relatively brief
Constitution include such a mundane and obviously redundant provi-
sion as the Opinions Clause?
The answer is instructive. Apart from the presidency and the vice
presidency, which are created directly by the Constitution, 79 all execu-
tive offices result from statutes.8 0 The Constitution contemplates the
existence of "principal Officer[s] in each of the executive Depart-
ments," but it does not of its own force create either the officers or the
76 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
77 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
78 The Vesting Clause of Article II, like the Vesting Clause of Article III, is a grant
of power to the President rather than a mere designation of office. See Steven G.
Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1377, 1389-91 (1994);
Lawson & Seidman, supra note 11, at 22-43. Many separation of powers scholars will
likely cringe at the thought that such a fundamental and hotly contested matter as the
source of presidential power could be dismissed with but a cheeky footnote, but that
is just too bad. The question simply is not a close one from the standpoint of original
meaning.
79 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
80 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure
in Office, 92 VA. L. REv. 1779, 1787-88 (2006).
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departments. Congress must do so. And because there is no specific
"executive officers and departments clause," the authority to create
the offices and institutions of the executive department must stem
from the Sweeping Clause: Congress can create offices and depart-
ments when it is "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution"
federal powers. Congressional statutes create the offices, define the
powers of the offices, and set the salaries and other benefits of the
offices. One can readily imagine Congress arguing that because, for
example, the Secretary of State exists only because of congressional
statutes, Congress can therefore require the Secretary of State to pre-
pare reports that are given only to Congress and not to the President. Con-
gress, in other words, might be tempted to create presidential
subordinates who are effectively answerable to Congress rather than
the President by cutting off presidential access to his or her own staff.
As a matter of original meaning, the statute would be unconstitu-
tional. The Constitution vests the executive power directly in the Pres-
ident, so it can never be "necessary and proper" for Congress to
prevent the President from exercising that power by limiting the Presi-
dent's ability to supervise subordinates. But that does not mean that
Congress won't try it-no more than an absence of constitutional
authority to restrict freedom of speech will prevent a rogue Congress
from enacting the Alien and Sedition Acts. And given that Congress
has the power to impeach and remove Presidents,"' which signifi-
cantly raises the stakes of conflicts between Congress and the Presi-
dent, it is not unreasonable to include in the Constitution a clause
that makes it too clear even for bad argument that the President must
have a free flow of communication with top subordinates. The Opin-
ions Clause does not add some new restriction on Congress that
would not have existed in its absence, but it instead clarifies and
amplifies what is already contained elsewhere in the Constitution in
order to minimize the risk of interdepartmental conflict in a predict-
ably recurring context that might threaten to escalate into a national
crisis.
The same considerations explain the Commander in Chief
Clause, which declares the President to be "Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the sev-
eral States, when called into the actual Service of the United States."82
Surely the vesting of the "executive Power" in the President includes
the ability to command the military; that is the very essence of execu-
81 U.S. CONST. art I, §§ 2-3.
82 Id art. II, § 2, c. 1.
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tive power.8 3 But while Congress is not directly granted any power in
Article I to control troop movements, it is granted a wide range of
other military powers, including the power "[t]o declare War, grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures
on Land and Water, '8 4 "[t]o raise and support Armies, 8s 5 "[t]o pro-
vide and maintain a Navy," 6 "[t]o make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,"8 7 "[t]o provide for call-
ing forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insur-
rections and repel Invasions,"'88 and "[t]o provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining, the Militia."8' 9 Could Congress claim that in
order to carry into effect these other powers, it is "necessary and
proper" for it to direct troop movements as well? Such an argument
would be constitutional error even in the absence of an express Com-
mander in Chief Clause, but one can easily imagine Congress making
such an argument and thereby precipitating a constitutional crisis at
the worst possible moment. There is nothing strange about trying to
take that issue completely off of the table so that Congress does not
even consider making a dubious argument for control of troop move-
ments at a time when legal wrangling could prove very costly. Conse-
quently, if Congress tries to control troop movements, one could
correctly say either that it is violating the Commander in Chief Clause,
that it is violating the Article II Vesting Clause, or that it is exceeding
its enumerated powers under Article I, Section 8.
Thus, there is considerable constitutional value in provisions that
do not actually change the legal landscape by creating new rights and
obligations but simply emphasize, clarify, and amplify rights and obli-
gations already contained in the Constitution. There is value, in other
words, in truisms.
The Bill of Rights is much like the Opinions Clause or the Com-
mander in Chief Clause. Congressional laws forbidding criticism of
the government were unconstitutional before the First Amendment
was ratified. In that sense, the First Amendment, for example, did not
create enforceable rights of free speech that did not exist in its
absence. The First Amendment, as did the other provisions of the Bill
of Rights, simply declared something that was already true of the
83 Roger D. Scott, Kimmel, Short, McVay: Case Studies in Executive Authority, Law and
the Individual Rights of Military Commanders, 156 MIL. L. REv. 52, 55 (1998).
84 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
85 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
86 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
87 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
88 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
89 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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unamended Constitution. That does not make those provisions
meaningless. Just as there is value in an Opinions Clause and a Com-
mander in Chief Clause that do not actually "change" the Constitu-
tion, there can be value in provisions that clarify but do not alter the
law. If the Federalists were right about the original design of the Con-
stitution and the proper construction of the Sweeping Clause-and
they were-then the entire Bill of Rights is primarily an exercise in
clarification.
To be sure, there are two important respects in which the Bill of
Rights did, intentionally or not, make substantive changes in the legal
landscape. First, when Congress legislates for federal territories or the
District of Columbia, it does so pursuant to specific grants of power
which constitute Congress as a general rather than limited government
in those contexts.90 In other words, when Congress enacts laws gov-
erning territories or the District, it does not need to find authorization
for those laws in the specific subject-matter enumerations in Article I,
Section 8 or the Sweeping Clause. It has general legislative authority,
equivalent to a state government, by virtue of targeted enumerations
that create such general authority within limited spheres.91 If the rea-
son why laws abridging speech, authorizing general warrants, and
abolishing jury trial were unconstitutional before December 15, 1791,
is that such laws would not be "necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution" federal powers, then such reasoning would not apply to
territories and the District because Congress would not need to invoke
the Sweeping Clause as justification for any laws in that setting.92
There is no "necessary and proper" requirement in either the District
90 See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE 189-91
(2004).
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
92 Can there be cases in which Congress, outside of federally owned territory, is
able to legislate without reference to the Sweeping Clause and thus could validly have
threatened the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights prior to December 15, 1791-
for example, by legislating directly under the Commerce Clause or the Taxing
Clause? The answer is "yes in theory" but "no in practice." All laws dealing with the
funding, implementation, and enforcement of (including the prescription of penal-
ties for violating) a statutory scheme are laws that must be enacted under the Sweep-
ing Clause. It is generally those implementational laws rather than the regulation
itself that pose the danger to liberty. Even where the regulation itself is the source of
danger, it would not be "proper" to implement the regulation if the result was to
violate the background rights of the people. For example, it is possible to imagine
direct exercises of the commerce power that are so self-contained that they require no
use of the Sweeping Clause, but it is very difficult to do. For a discussion of one of the
relatively rare examples, see Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation
ofJudicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 206-10 (2001).
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Clause or the Territories Clause and accordingly there is no textual
hook on which to hang any limitations on congressional power. The
Bill of Rights, however, is phrased generally enough to apply to all
exercises of congressional power, including exercises grounded in the
District Clause or Territories Clause. Accordingly, the Bill of Rights
added new law to the Constitution by limiting to some degree Con-
gress' ability to legislate in federal territory.
Second, it is theoretically possible that the specification of norms
in the Bill of Rights might have broadened to some degree the limita-
tions on governmental action contained in the original Constitution.
This could happen if the articulation of the norm in a specific amend-
ment does not track precisely the form that the norm would -have
taken in the absence of express articulation.
In principle, the Bill of Rights could express norms either more
broadly or more narrowly than the norms contained within the "nec-
essary and proper" requirement of the Sweeping Clause (or the prin-
ciple of reasonableness implicit in the Article II and Article III Vesting
Clauses93). If the norm as articulated in the Bill of Rights is narrower
than the norm in the original Constitution, it would not change the
pre-Bill of Rights law. To reason otherwise would be to treat the Bill
of Rights at least partially as a grant of power to the national govern-
ment, and that is an utterly implausible construction. For example,
the Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to a civil jury in common
law actions "where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol-
lars."94 The civil jury was one of the rights most cherished in 1787,
and prior to December 15, 1791, it surely, as Hamilton noted,95 would
not have been "necessary and proper" for Congress to try to restrict
it-or at the very least to restrict it more than did the state in which
the relevant federal trial was held. 96 But did the "necessary and
proper" language in the Sweeping Clause incorporate a below-twenty-
dollar exception to this civil jury trial right? I am no expert on civil
juries and would not want to venture a guess here.97 If the answer is
no, however, then the Seventh Amendment could not have added
93 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1.
94 Id. amend. VII.
95 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
96 For the proposition that the Seventh Amendment requires federal adherence
to state civil jury practices, see AMAR, supra note 6, at 88-93. I am in no position to
affirm or deny the proposition, though it is the sort of proposition about which I
would be very hesitant to bet against Professor Amar.
97 Nor does it seem that experts have much to say about the twenty-dollar limit
and its origins. See Note, The Twenty Dollars Clause, 118 H~av. L. REv. 1665, 1665-66
(2005).
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such an exception, because the Seventh Amendment is not a grant of
power to Congress.
Could it be the case that prior to December 15, 1791, it would
have been permissible for Congress to limit civil jury rights in at least
some cases where the amount in controversy was higher than twenty
dollars? If so, then ratification of the Seventh Amendment would for-
bid at least some laws outside of federal territories or the District of
Columbia that had previously been permitted, so that even outside of
the territories, the Seventh Amendment might not function entirely as
a truism (with or without attitude).
The Sixth Amendment even more likely changes some of the
legal rules within the states. 98 The text of Article III provides that
criminal trials "shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall
have been committed." 99 The Sixth Amendment specifies that crimi-
nal defendants "shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed." 100 The Sixth Amendment thus requires an addi-
tional element of locality, which narrows the range of laws that Con-
gress could lawfully pass. It is perhaps conceivable that the Sweeping
Clause contained this vicinage requirement from the start, and that
Article III was merely emphasizing one aspect of this requirement, but
that seems like an odd reading of Article III, which (unlike Article II)
does not appear to contain a lot of redundant provisions.
Thus, there can probably be circumstances in which some of the
first eight provisions of the Bill of Rights can do what the Tenth
Amendment cannot: invalidate congressional laws outside of federal
territories that would not have been invalid before ratification of the
Bill of Rights. Thus, I do not want to be understood to say that the
Bill of Rights was, outside of the territories, entirely an emphasizing,
clarifying, and amplifying instrument. My point is only that the Bill of
Rights served that function most of the time, and that the instances in
which it operates to limit the power of Congress in the states are rela-
tively few and far between. The Tenth Amendment and its nine sib-
lings are not identical dectuplets, but the similarities among them are
far more striking than the differences.
Therefore, one cannot say that the Bill of Rights in its entirety is
only a truism. But one can say that the Bill of Rights in its entirety is
98 I am profoundly grateful to David Rossman for bringing this example to my
attention.
99 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
100 Id. amend. VI (emphasis added).
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primarily a truism. It is certainly a truism in the vast majority of appli-
cations for which it is invoked.
If Congress tries to outlaw publication of pamphlets critical of the
government, the most basic constitutional problem with that statute is
the absence of any congressional power to enact it.101 The First
Amendment ("Congress shall make no law") emphasizes, clarifies, and
amplifies that absence. There may, however, be circumstances in
which it is more convenient-easier, clearer, and simpler-to invoke
the First Amendment as the ground for invalidation of the law rather
than to go "beneath" the First Amendment to the scheme of enumer-
ated powers. In that respect, it makes good sense to speak of laws that
violate the First Amendment, and even to speak of a broader First
Amendment doctrine which describes the set of laws concerning
speech and religion that exceed the enumerated powers of Congress.
Even though it would be conceptually possible to reach precisely the
same results (legislation concerning territories and the occasional
exercise of congressional power sans the Sweeping Clause aside) with-
out mentioning the First Amendment, the existence of a First Amend-
ment can add conceptual clarity to the inquiry and can focus
attention on instances of federal overreaching that might otherwise
escape notice. That is precisely the original function of the Bill of
Rights, and it is not a function to dismiss lightly.
E. The "Proper" Understanding of the Tenth Amendment
We can now understand the constitutional role and meaning of
the Tenth Amendment. The original unamended Constitution
embodied the principle of enumerated federal powers. Had the
Tenth Amendment never been ratified, it still would have been true
that federal institutions could only exercise powers that were actually
granted by the Constitution and could not properly rely upon genera-
lized assumptions about powers exercised by other governments
throughout the world. The fact that most governments, or even all
other governments, have a certain power would not entitle the federal
government to exercise that power. The Tenth Amendment does not
create this principle, but it confirms, clarifies, and amplifies it.
The Tenth Amendment reflects some other principles as well.
The principle of limited federal power coexists with a principle of (as
far as the Federal Constitution is concerned) unlimited state power. 10 2
101 At least this is true when Congress is not legislating for federally owned
territory.
102 State power can, of course, be limited by state constitutions, or conceivably
even by natural law, whether or not it is limited by the Federal Constitution.
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The Constitution of 1787 specifically limits states in a number of ways,
most notably the enumerated restrictions in Article I, Section 10,103
but the default rule is that constitutional provisions refer only to fed-
eral institutions unless they specifically say otherwise. 10 4 Because the
Constitution limits states in specific ways, other federal limitations on
states are potentially inconsistent with the constitutional design and
thus might fail to be "necessary and proper."
An example from the realm of separation of powers is instructive.
The Appointments Clause provides, in relevant part, that the
President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate, shall appoint ... Officers of the United States... but the Con-
gress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
in the Heads of Departments.
10 5
Congress and one of its constituent parts (the Senate) are given spe-
cific roles in the process for appointing federal officers. 10 6 Congress
cannot give itself additional roles via the Sweeping Clause. Those
other roles would be inconsistent with the constitutional design and
thus fail to be "necessary and proper." Specifically, Congress could
not, under the guise of the Sweeping Clause, try to give appointment
power to the president pro tempore of the Senate or the Speaker of
the House. 10 7 Congress cannot alter the design of the appointments
process even though the Constitution of 1787 does not contain a spe-
cific "Separation of Powers Clause." The absence of such a clause
does not mean that separation of powers principles are not real, nor
does it mean that such principles cannot find textual expression in
the Sweeping Clause's requirements of necessity and propriety.
103 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
104 That is how, for example, the Article II Vesting Clause can grant the President
.executive Power" without making the President the chief executive of Oregon.
105 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Note that Congress may alter the baseline rule for
the appointment of inferior officers "as they think proper," id. (emphasis added), in
contrast to the Sweeping Clause's authorization of laws which "shall be necessary and
proper," id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
106 Under the Appointments Clause, Congress may determine which inferior
officers can be appointed without Senate confirmation but has no other direct role in
the appointment process. The Senate has the advice and consent power but no other
role.
107 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-19, 124-37 (1976) (per curiam) (holding
that Congress cannot grant itself, the Speaker of the House, or the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate a role in the federal appointments process that is not spelled
out in the Appointments Clause).
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By the same token, the absence of a specific "Federalism Clause"
in the Constitution does not give Congress license to alter the consti-
tutional design of federalism, and it does not mean that substantive
principles of federalism cannot legitimately be located in the Sweep-
ing Clause. Just as the First Amendment restates limitations on the
federal government's power of speech and religion contained in the
original Constitution, the Fourth Amendment restates limitations on
the federal government's law enforcement powers contained in the
original Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment restates limitations
on federal power with respect to criminal juries contained in the origi-
nal Constitution, the Tenth Amendment restates limitations on the
federal government's power to regulate states contained in the origi-
nal Constitution. These limitations, based on the structure of Ameri-
can constitutional government, are not, as a 5-4 majority of the
Supreme Court once described them, "freestanding conceptions of
state sovereignty."1 0 8 They are conceptions of state sovereignty that
are textually embodied in the Sweeping Clause and then textually restated in
the Tenth Amendment. Whenever Congress tries to implement federal
power in a fashion that implicates state governance or state institu-
tions, one must always ask whether the law is "necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution" federal power-and as a matter of origi-
nal meaning the phrase "necessary and proper" carries serious bite.
That is a textual inquiry, to the same extent that it is a textual inquiry
to determine whether a particular executive employee is an "Officer[]
of the United States" subject to the Appointments Clause. 10 9 There is
no definition of an "Officer[]" provided in the Constitution, nor does
the text, structure, or history of the document provide crisp guide-
lines for determining whether any specific person who receives a gov-
ernment paycheck rises to the level of an "Officer[]." But surely that
does not mean that one is illegitimately resorting to "freestanding
conceptions of federal officer-dom" by deciding, for instance, that a
commissioner of the Federal Election Commission is an officer 1 0
while an administrative law judge for the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation is not.'11 It may be a difficult inquiry, and one might
even reach questionable results on occasion," 12 but the inquiry is man-
dated by the constitutional text. Similarly, there is nothing "freestand-
ing" about principles of federalism that are textually embodied in the
108 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985).
109 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
110 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
111 See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
112 It is far from obvious, for instance, that an administrative law judge is not actu-
ally an "Officer[] of the United States." See id. at 1140-43 (Randolph,J., concurring).
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requirement that federal laws be "necessary and proper." And those
same principles do not become "freestanding" when they are then
reflected in the Tenth Amendment.
The value of expressing those principles in a separate amend-
ment is the same as the value of expressing principles of free speech
in the First Amendment. One could develop a body of federalism
doctrine entirely under the Sweeping Clause and other principles
embedded in the constitutional text, as indeed has happened with the
separation of powers. But expressing those principles in a separate
provision such as the Tenth Amendment provides clarity and may
help focus attention on instances of federal overreaching that might
otherwise escape notice. Norms can function without verbal expres-
sion, but norms sometimes function better when made concrete.
To a very modest extent, modern law has recognized that the
Sweeping Clause textually incorporates principles of federalism that
are reflected in the Tenth Amendment. In Printz v. United States,
113
the Supreme Court held that Congress could not compel state law
enforcement officials to conduct federally prescribed background
checks on gun purchasers.114 In response to the claim that such a law
could be justified under the Sweeping Clause, the Court explained
that " [w] hen a 'La[w] ... for carrying into Execution' the Commerce
Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty ... it is not a 'La[w]
S. .proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause.'
115
More controversially, the Court has also understood the constitutional
requirement of propriety to limit the extent to which states can be
sued under federal law. 1 6 The idea that federal law must conform to
a "proper" structure of federalism is neither as revolutionary nor as
ungrounded in practice as it might seem.
From the standpoint of original meaning, however, the central
question is not what the courts have held but what the Constitution
prescribes-and it prescribes what can broadly be called federalism
limitations on Congress. The secondary question is thus not whether
the Tenth Amendment contains substantive principles of federalism
but what those principles look like. In other words, what is the "proper"
distribution of state and federal powers that is reflected in the Tenth
Amendment? Full consideration of a theory of constitutional federal-
ism is best left to other times and other authors, but the best way to
113 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
114 Id. at 922.
115 Id. at 923-24 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
116 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732-33 (1999). I have no decided view on
whether this particular line of authority is correct.
[VOL. 83:2
A TRUISM WITH ATTITUDE
flesh out the broad contours of the Tenth Amendment is to look at
some concrete problems on which it has been brought to bear.
II. THE TENTH AMENDMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
There are risks as well as benefits to including clarifying or ampli-
fying provisions in a constitution. The obvious benefits are the
increased likelihood that constitutional principles will be respected
and the minimization of conflict in areas where the costs of conflict
are potentially high. The corresponding risk is that the clarifying or
amplifying provisions will take on a life of their own that is not con-
nected to their original meaning or function. There is a good argu-
ment that those risks have been realized with many provisions of the
Bill of Rights. It is, for example, doubtful that the set of laws affecting
speech that would not be "necessary and proper for carrying into Exe-
cution" federal power maps precisely onto the set of laws invalidated
under modern First Amendment doctrine. Because doctrine regard-
ing speech has developed under the rubric of the First Amendment
rather than (as the Federalists would have preferred) as a search for
enumerated federal powers, the contours of that doctrine are no
doubt quite different than those that would have resulted from a dif-
ferent analytical framework.
The Tenth Amendment offers the same benefits and risks. There
is value in clarifying the limited scope of federal power and the
residual role of the states, but there is also a risk that expressing those
principles in a distinct clause will give rise to doctrinal developments
that might be far removed from the original constitutional principles
that were sought to be clarified or amplified by the Tenth Amend-
ment. Has this in fact happened, or has Tenth Amendment doctrine
more or less accurately reflected the constitutional world created by
the pre-December 15, 1791, Constitution?
For the most part, laws that have been questioned or invalidated
under the Tenth Amendment have at least arguably exceeded the
enumerated powers of Congress under the original Constitution,
including the enumerated power to "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" federal powers.
Some of those laws present very close and difficult constitutional ques-
tions, and they have appropriately resulted in very close and difficult
constitutional cases. This Article can make only the briefest survey of
this point, but it will be enough to show that the Tenth Amendment
has been, from the standpoint of original constitutional design, more
of a success than a failure.
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A. Commandeering
On at least two occasions, the Supreme Court has held that Con-
gress violated the Tenth Amendment by "commandeering" state legis-
lative or executive institutions. Following the principle that Congress
cannot "commandeer[] the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program," 117 the Court held in New York v. United States'1 8 that Con-
gress could not force states to choose between making legislative pro-
vision for the disposal of nuclear waste within their borders or taking
title to (and thereby assuming corresponding liability for) the
waste.' 19 And in Printz, the Court held that Congress could not force
state law enforcement officials to implement and monitor federally
mandated background checks on gun purchasers. 120 On the other
hand, settled case law establishes that Congress has the power to com-
pel state courts to adjudicate claims arising under federal law;121 the
modern Tenth Amendment "anticommandeering" principle is limited
to state legislatures and executives.
While it would take a separate article to outline the precise con-
tours of a correct anticommandeering doctrine, the general outline of
the modern approach accurately reflects the pre-Tenth Amendment
Constitution. There is no express provision in the Constitution
authorizing Congress to direct the activities of state legislative or exec-
utive officials, so any such federal power must stem from the Sweeping
Clause. But while Congress might on some occasions be able to make
good arguments that conscripting state officials for federal ends might
be "necessary" for effectuating federal powers, it is hard to see how
such actions could ever be "proper." The Court in Printz specifically
recognized the crucial role in this inquiry played by the propriety
requirement of the Sweeping Clause, 122 and a close look at the consti-
tutional structure will demonstrate that the Court was right.
The Constitution on some occasions requires congressional con-
sent before states may act, 123 and on other occasions it specifically pro-
117 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
118 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
119 See id. at 174-77.
120 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 918-28.
121 See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389-94 (1947).
122 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 923-24.
123 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace,
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or
engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit
of delay.").
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vides that state legislative action will be subject to the "Revision and
Controul" of Congress. 124 But nowhere does the Constitution specifi-
cally authorize Congress to designate state legislative or executive offi-
cials as unwilling partners in federal programs. That is especially
significant because the Constitution does expressly authorize Congress
to commandeer state judicial institutions. The Tribunals Clause
authorizes Congress to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court."'1 25 This provision both permits Congress to create distinct fed-
eral courts and to designate preexisting state courts as part of the fed-
eral judicial hierarchy subject to the control and direction of the
Supreme Court.126 The practice of designating state courts as federal
institutions was familiar from the Articles of Confederation. 27 There
is no comparable constitutional provision authorizing Congress to
"constitute Executives inferior to the President" or to "constitute Leg-
islatures inferior to Congress." It would do considerable violence to
the constitutional structure, and therefore be improper under the
Sweeping Clause, for Congress to try to do with state executive and
legislative officials what the Constitution carefully permits Congress to
do with state judicial officials.
Professor Saikrishna Prakash has argued that commandeering of
state legislatures is constitutionally forbidden but commandeering of
state executive and judicial institutions is permissible. 128 His argu-
ment is based on the historical and conceptual linkages between exec-
utive and judicial officers, and his starting point is correct: the
eighteenth-century conceptual line between executive and judicial
officers was thin at best.129 The Constitution, however, does unam-
124 See id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 ("No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely neces-
sary for executing it's [sic] inspection Laws ... and all such Laws shall be subject to the
Revision and Controul of the Congress." (emphasis added)).
125 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
126 For a fuller account of Congress' power to "commandeer" state courts under
the Tribunals Clause, see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive,
Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1028-29 (2007).
127 See Michael G. Collins, The Federal Courts, the First Congress, and the Non-Settlement
of 1789, 91 VA. L. REv. 1515, 1525-26 (2005).
128 See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1957,
2033 (1993) ("[T]he Constitution abandoned the idea of instructing legislatures on
how to legislate. Instead, the Constitution empowers the federal government to 'req-
uisition' directly the assistance of state executives and courts.").
129 See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 103-05
(1995).
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biguously try to distinguish executive from judicial institutions, 130 and
by making specific provision for the "commandeering" of state judicial
but not executive institutions, it rules out Professor Prakash's abstract
argument, however theoretically appealing it might be.
The Tenth Amendment doctrine that limits Congress' ability to
commandeer state legislatures and executives while permitting Con-
gress to commandeer state judicial institutions thus provides the
proper structure for constitutional analysis. Careful study would be
needed to determine the precise contours of those limits and permis-
sions (can Congress never enlist state legislative or executive officials
but always conscript state judges?), but Tenth Amendment doctrine at
least points in the right direction.
B. Spending Conditions
Congress seldom directly tries to tell state legislative and execu-
tive officials what to do. More commonly, it seeks to "bribe" them by
offering federal money with conditions: states do not have to take the
money, but if they do, they must comply with the applicable federal
directives. Although the Supreme Court has never invalidated a fed-
eral spending condition imposed on the states, it has indicated that
federal spending conditions can be invalid if they are unclear or
ambiguous, if they amount to coercion of state institutions (a form of
back-door commandeering), or if they are unrelated to appropriate
federal objectives.1 3 ' In 2001, a state supreme court invalidated a fed-
eral spending provision that regulated the use of evidence in state
court proceedings; 3 2 the Supreme Court reversed the decision on




130 Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America."), with id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 ("The judicial
Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court .... ").
131 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987). For thoughtful studies
of the issues raised by conditional spending, see Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman,
Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-
Clever Congress Could Provoke It To Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 469-85 (2003); Lynn A.
Baker, Lochner's Legacy for Modern Federalism: Pierce County v. Guillen as a Case Study,
85 B.U. L. REV. 727, 739-50 (2005).
132 See Guillen v. Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628, 655 (Wash. 2001) ("Congress funda-
mentally lacks authority to intrude upon state sovereignty by barring state and local
courts from admitting into evidence or allowing pretrial discovery of routinely created
traffic and accident related materials . . . simply because such collections also serve
federal purposes."), rev'd in part, 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
133 See Guillen, 537 U.S. at 146-48.
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On the surface, federal spending conditions would seem to have
little to do with the Tenth Amendment: the federal government has
the undoubted constitutional power to spend money, so why would
anyone think that the unpromising language of the Tenth Amend-
ment constrains that power in any way? Again, however, modern
Tenth Amendment doctrine points in the right direction, though the
constitutional constraints on Congress's spending power are actually
far broader than current law contemplates.
Perhaps surprisingly, there is no express "Spending Clause" in
the federal Constitution. No sane person has ever doubted that the
Constitution somewhere confers on Congress the power to spend, but
the location of the power matters, because the source of the power
determines its scope. Ever since 1936, the provision almost universally
identified as the Constitution's Spending Clause is Article I, Section 8,
Clause 1, which gives Congress "Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the com-
mon Defence and general Welfare of the United States."'134 This pro-
vision does not appear to place any limits on conditional spending,
but that is not surprising, as the provision does not address spending
at all. This provision is a Taxing Clause, not a Spending Clause. Tex-
tually, grammatically, structurally, and historically, it grants not one
whit of power to spend money.' 3 5 It authorizes Congress to raise
money and specifies the purposes for which money may be raised but
says nothing about how that money shall be spent. The Taxing Clause
takes for granted the conclusion that there must be a Spending Clause
of some sort elsewhere in the Constitution-why tax if you cannot
spend?-but is not itself a Spending Clause. The point is actually
obvious upon cursory analysis, 136 and the modern "Spending Clause"
doctrine is accordingly something of an embarrassment.
134 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The identification of this provision as the Spend-
ing Clause is characteristically traced to United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
135 See Gary Lawson, Making a Federal Case Out of It: Sabri v. United States and the
Constitution of Leviathan, 2003-2004 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 119, 133-39; Jeffrey T. Renz,
What Spending Clause? (Or the President's Paramour): An Examination of the Views of Hamil-
ton, Madison, and Stoty on Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, 33J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 81, 136-40 (1999).
136 If the power to spend is inferred from the power to tax and is therefore tracea-
ble to Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, does that mean that there is no constitutional
power to spend money that is raised from land sales or borrowing? After all, "the
spending allusion in the Taxing Clause does not even colorably reach borrowed
sums." David E. Engdahl, The Basis of the Spending Power, 18 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 215,
222 (1995). Of course Congress has the power to spend money raised through prop-
erty sales or borrowing-which simply proves that the power to spend cannot be
inferred from the Taxing Clause. Id.
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From the standpoint of original meaning, the Constitution's
"Spending Clause" is actually the Sweeping Clause. 137 Appropriations
laws are a classic example of laws "for carrying into Execution" federal
powers; very few federal powers can be executed without funding of
some sort. Accordingly, Congress has ample constitutional power to
fund federal activities. But the Sweeping Clause imposes two limita-
tions on federal spending that are relevant to federalism. First,
because the Sweeping Clause only authorizes laws that are necessary
and proper "for carrying into Execution" enumerated federal powers,
any spending laws enacted by Congress must actually implement fed-
eral powers. If a spending condition is unrelated to the exercise or
execution of otherwise enumerated federal powers, it exceeds Con-
gress' authority. A fair percentage of modern conditional spending
bills implicate this concern. If Congress has, for example, no constitu-
tional power to define marriage, it has no constitutional power to con-
dition a state's receipt of federal money on the state's definition of
marriage because the condition does not "carry[] into Execution" any
federal power. The requirement in modern case law that spending
conditions be related to legitimate federal ends is thus a special case
of the more general principle that all federal spending, whether con-
ditional or unconditional, must be related to legitimate federal ends.
In addition to being "for carrying into Execution" federal ends,
all spending bills must be "necessary and proper" means for imple-
menting federal powers. This limitation is the appropriate source for
the "germaneness" requirement in modern spending law. Even if
Congress has the constitutional power to act in a certain fashion, so
that specific spending measures could in principle be "for carrying
into Execution" some legitimate federal end, any spending measure
must be "necessary and proper" for that purpose. If a spending condi-
tion is truly nongermane to the federal program to which it is
attached, it is extremely difficult to see how any such measure could
be "necessary," even understanding "necessary" in the modest Madis-
onian rather than the strictJeffersonian sense.138 At the very least, the
137 Professor David Engdahl has sought to locate the federal spending power in
the clause authorizing Congress "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regu-
lations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States."
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DuKE L.J. 1,
51-52 (1994). The claim is more plausible than it might seem at first glance, but it
runs afoul of structural considerations: it is inconceivable that something as crucial as
the power to appropriate funds would be buried in the bowels of Article IV rather
than placed with all of the other financial powers of the federal government in Article
I. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 90, at 28-30.
138 See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 83:2
A TRUISM WITH ATTITUDE
terms of the Sweeping Clause would call for a careful assessment of
the means-ends connection in any conditional spending bill-which is
precisely what a moderately beefed-up version of current law would
require.
The anticoercion principle in spending jurisprudence can also be
seen as a special case of a more general anticommandeering princi-
ple, though here the connection to underlying constitutional norms is
less direct. If the Sweeping Clause does not permit direct conscrip-
tion of state legislative or executive officials because any such law
would not be "necessary and proper," it is not a large stretch (though
it may be a small one) to make the same claim with respect to condi-
tional spending laws in circumstances that permit the states little real-
istic choice but to take the money and conditions. It is a big task, of
course, to identify circumstances in which what looks like a voluntary
transaction in fact takes place against a backdrop of federal usurpa-
tion of taxing and spending authority so large that it effectively denies
states realistic choices, but happily that is a task that some people
wiser than I are willing to undertake.13 9 The only present concern is
the validity of the general anticoercion principle reflected in modern
Tenth Amendment law, and that principle-however difficult its
application in specific cases-is fundamentally sound whenever the
line between conditions and commandeering is sufficiently blurred.
C. Regulation of State Affairs
In 1976, the Supreme Court sent shockwaves through the consti-
tutional world by holding unconstitutional Congress' extension of fed-
eral minimum wage and maximum hour laws to state employees. 140
The case was expressly decided under the rubric of the Commerce
Clause14 1-the Court held for the first time in forty years that a fed-
eral statute exceeded Congress' authority to regulate commerce
among the several states-but the Tenth Amendment loomed large as
139 See generally Baker & Berman, supra note 131, at 469-85 (maintaining that Dole
is an ineffective test for the congressional spending power); Mitchell N. Berman, Coer-
cion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1,
1-48 (2001) ("[A]ny given conditional governmental offer is (presumptively) uncon-
stitutional if it is coercive, and that coercion has a coherent meaning supplied by
bedrock constitutional logic that transcends the particularities that govern a specific
region of constitutional law.").
140 See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
141 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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a shadow.142 Nine years later, the Court reversed its decision and
upheld such federal legislative power over state operations.1 43 Both
decisions were 5-4, and it is not inconceivable that the pendulum
could swing in either direction in the foreseeable future. Does the
Tenth Amendment, properly understood as a mere truism, have any-
thing to say about this issue?
The prescription of minimum wages or maximum hours cannot
plausibly be characterized as a regulation of commerce. Indeed,
when read carefully, the seminal New Deal decision that originally
upheld federal power to pass such laws did not uphold those laws as
regulations of commerce but rather as measures "necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution" the commerce power. 144 If there
is a constitutional source for the federal power to prescribe minimum
wages and maximum hours, it is the Sweeping Clause.
Assuming for the sake of argument (and this assumption is not
likely to be seriously challenged in the modern legal world) that the
Sweeping Clause authorizes minimum wage and maximum hour laws
in general, is there something unique about state employees that
might change the analysis when state institutions are concerned? The
answer is "possibly." Part of what it means for a law under the Sweep-
ing Clause to be "proper" is to be consistent with background princi-
ples of federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights. Far
from being a "free floating abstraction," the basic principle of federal-
ism is textually grounded in the very provision that Congress must
employ to enact laws regulating state employment practices.
The trick is to identify the contours of those principles. Because
the word "proper" in the Sweeping Clause does not provide much of a
guide, it is tempting to say that the inquiry should not even be under-
taken because it is too open-ended. But this imposes on the Constitu-
tion a normative vision of what a Constitution must say that may or
may not correspond to what the Constitution of 1787 actually says.
Constitutions can be very specific, very general, or something in
between. Different provisions of a Constitution may follow different
models of specificity. The actual (as opposed to ideal) degree of spec-
ificity or generality of any particular constitutional provision cannot
be determined in advance by abstract reasoning; it is, as economists
are fond of saying, an empirical question. If the Constitution chooses
142 See Usery, 426 U.S. at 842-43, 855. Subsequent opinions describing (and
attempting to resuscitate) Useiy stressed the Tenth Amendment more than did the
original opinion. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560-61, 567, 570, 573-74 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
143 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557 (majority opinion).
144 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1941).
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to implement a system of separation of powers through a combination
of relatively specific structural provisions such as prohibitions on
reductions of presidential or judicial salaries, 145 relatively general
structural provisions such as the executive and judicial Vesting
Clauses, and an open-ended "catch-all" provision that requires execu-
tory laws to be "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" fed-
eral powers, that is the Constitution's business. The difficulty in some,
or even many, cases of determining whether a particular congres-
sional innovation is "necessary and proper" may mean that the Consti-
tution was poorly drafted, but it does not relieve one of the obligation
to conduct the inquiry if one is actually trying to interpret and apply
the Constitution as it exists. Similarly, if the Constitution contains a
general rather than specific injunction regarding federalism, it is no
less of a constitutional injunction for being general.
So, does Congress violate the Constitution by prescribing mini-
mum wage and maximum hour rules for state employees? I haven't
the foggiest idea. Five Justices in National League of Cities v. Usery1
46
thought that such laws intruded so deeply into basic decisions regard-
ing the structure and operation of state institutions that they
exceeded Congress' power, while four Justices in the same case
thought that such laws were no different from numerous general laws
that routinely bind states as well as individuals. It is quite possible that
a full answer to this question would require detailed knowledge of
history, political science, management theory, and economics. I do
not have degrees in any of these fields; indeed, it is debatable whether
I have a degree in law.' 47 It is enormously difficult to determine the
extent to which Congress can regulate state governmental processes-
which proves nothing more than that hard cases are hard.
Careful analysis may or may not ultimately show that such laws
run afoul of the principle embodied in the original Constitution and
reflected in the Tenth Amendment, but careful analysis is most assur-
edly called for. The scope of federal power in this regard is a legiti-
mate question, and Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is right to ask it
145 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 ("The President shall, at stated Times, receive for
his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished dur-
ing the Period for which he shall have been elected ...."); id. art. III, § 1 ("The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall ... at stated Times, receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continu-
ance in Office."). Of course, difficult questions can arise about what counts as com-
pensation and when it has been reduced-which only proves that specificity is always
relative.
146 426 U.S. 833.
147 J.D. 1983, Yale Law(?) School.
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and to take it seriously enough to generate 5-4 decisions. Indeed, a
string of 5-4 decisions going in different directions may well be the
most appropriate answer.
CONCLUSION
The most distinctive constitutional feature of the Tenth Amend-
ment is its lack of distinctiveness. The Tenth Amendment should not
apologize for invalidating federal laws even though it is "but a truism."
Other constitutional provisions, such as the First Amendment, do it all
of the time without evident embarrassment. Nor should it apologize
for asking whether direct or indirect federal regulation of state institu-
tions is "proper." Similar questions are, and must be, asked every day
regarding the separation of powers. Nor should it apologize for leav-
ing constitutional interpreters with extremely difficult, and perhaps
even unresolvable, questions. That is simply one of the risks of the
trade. The Tenth Amendment talks the talk, and it should proudly
walk the walk.
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